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EDITORIAL
Impediments to database interoperation: legal issues and security concerns
The signiﬁcant growth of this annual over the past decade is testament to the importance of databases to scientiﬁc research in
general and biomedical sciences in particular. In fact, the centrality of databases within our society at large is demonstrated by the
continued debate in Congress regarding the legal protection of databases and the information they contain.
Productive utilization of databases requires interoperability: that is, the precise yet ﬂexible interrelating of information from one
database to another. There are, at present, two major impediments to achieving wide-scale interoperability: the state of database
protection legislation and computer security issues. While most non-commercial/academic databases may not be overly con-
cerned with the protection of their intellectual property, they still put up barriers to entrance, and consequently interoperability,
due to concerns regarding the security of their computing infrastructure. We succinctly outline these two issues below in an effort
to raise awareness of the issues among scientists.
The issues surrounding the legal protection of database are intricate and complex; this forum is not the place for complicated legal
doctrine, sufﬁce it to say that presently there is no intellectual property model that fully encompasses databases (1). But, what
ought to be stressed here is the impact of the present situation of relative anarchy (i.e. no laws expressly guaranteeing the
protection of databases here in the United States, in addition to the disparity of legal recourse between here and Europe) on the
scientiﬁc research front.
Bioinformatics research exempliﬁes the need to be able to integrate heterogeneous, diverse and distributed large-scale datasets. It
attempts to efﬁciently process, curate, manage, and mine the deluge of biological data available. As it does not produce its own
raw data, as is the case with manyother ﬁelds, it instead must examine and integrate other researchers’ data, relying on a culture of
sharing to attain this information. This integration, while obviously leading to a better understanding of whatever subject is at
hand, also tends to allow for the discovery of new and pertinent information regarding those biological systems: the sum is
deﬁnitely greater than its parts. The basic requirements for this integration are uniformity and accessibility; data are ineffectual if
scattered among incompatible resources.
Unfortunately though, without any legal recourse to protect their databases, many providers have looked toward digital rights
management schemes to defend their investments. The protections, digital locks that prevent easy access to data through
passwords, complicated web forms, digital watermarks, proprietary data formats, or the delivery of data in piecemeal and limited
form also serve to inhibit the interoperability of the databases by limiting the accessibility of each database and creating the need
for different interfaces for each database and encumbering the transfer of information to a medium where it can be manipulated
and analyzed.Worsestill are the database providersthat avoid digital protectionsall togetherand justrefrainfrom publishing their
datasets.
While the issue of protection of intellectual property may not be as pertinent in the academic universe, many academics make
great use of commercial databases and also have aspirations to commercialize their own research. Coherent legal protection of
databases may provide a way for academics to more easily access commercial information resources. In comparison to legal
issues, computer security concerns are a more direct impediment to interoperability for academics.
With the constant and ever growing barrage of malicious internet attacks (worms, viruses, or denial of service attacks, for
example) even academic facilities are forced to place limits and restrictions on access to their data. These limitations, like digital
rights management, tend to result in situations wherein access to data is limited and convoluted. The end result is the same:
different interfaces are required for each database thus hindering the interoperability of these systems. Unfortunately, integration
is only one of the casualties of the present situation. There are also signiﬁcant monetary and opportunity costs involved in
protecting of biomedical computing facilities from malevolent and random attacks, i.e., people and resources that could be used
towards research as opposed to the mundane maintenance of computers.
There are no easy solutions to either ofthese problems (2,3).Dueling forces in the Congress may never come to an agreement as to
what should be the proper level of protection for databases. But the scientiﬁc community must continue to be vocal as to our needs
within the continuing database protection debate. And there is no sign of the deluge of internet attacks letting up anytime soon.
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concerns anytime soon, it is up to the scientiﬁc community to recognize the need for change and to come together in a joint effort
to effect this change. Interoperability standards should be understood to be essential, developed, nurtured and maintained.
Ideally, we would like databases to be freely available and as ﬂexibly interoperable with one another as possible. There should be
standards (e.g. based on the various XML technologies) for how databases can be related to one another, and users should be able
to create and manipulate integrated views of multiple related disparate datasets. Public databases should have standards-based
web services-like interfaces so that users can script complex programs that work and interact across multiple databases distributed
across the world, as easily as if they had downloaded all the databases locally to their own site and coalesced them into a common
view (which is difﬁcult and time-consuming, but unfortunately the current norm for integrated analyses). Central agencies should
invest in either hosting tools and databases or in creating authentication schemes that provide, at the minimum, some added
protection against web attacks.
Dov Greenbaum
Andrew Smith
Mark Gerstein
REFERENCES
1. Greenbaum,D. (2003) Commentary: the database debate: in support of an inequitable solution. Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, 13, 431.
2. Greenbaum,D., Douglas,S.M., Smith,A., Lim,J., Fischer,M., Schultz,M. and Gerstein,M. (2004) Computer security in academia-a potential
roadblock to distributed annotation of the human genome. Nat. Biotechnol., 22, 771–772.
3. Greenbaum,D. and Gerstein,M. (2003) A universal legal framework as a prerequisite for database interoperability. Nat. Biotechnol., 21, 979–982.
D4 Nucleic Acids Research, 2005, Vol. 33, Database issue